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SECRET OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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1 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: National Military Command Structure and Departmental Headquarters Studies

1. The other Chiefs and I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the Steadman and Ignatius Reports. I believe you will find our views on these important reports positive and forthcoming.
2. As Dick Steadman points out, there are a number of things we can do to improve the institutional product of the joint system. I firmly believe, however, that the fundamental organizational structure is sound. I agree with Dick that there is no present need for dramatic change, such as the creation of a body of National Military Advisers.
3. Dick's recommendations provide an important first step in efforts to increase the effectiveness of military counsel -- particularly from the joint arena. Over the next several months, the other Chiefs and I will be looking for additional ways to improve the joint system. In addition to examining the quality of military advice, we will focus on the C³ and readiness areas. The goal is evolutionary -- but measurable -- improvement to the present system.
4. I suggest we discuss the Steadman and Ignatius Reports at an early SECDEF/JCS meeting.

DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-290-78
1 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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
Subject: Comments on the National Military Command
Structure and Departmental Headquarters Studies

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the National Military Command Structure (Steadman) and Department Headquarters (Ignatius) Studies as requested. The recommendations contained in these studies are viewed as innovative, positive suggestions directed at continuing evolutionary improvements in military operations, functions, and the quality of military advice.
2. While all of the recommendations in the studies warrant careful examination, those dealing with resource allocations, the role and function of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the relationships between the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of particular significance.
 - a. In an era that requires careful management of vital resources, an increased role for the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in resource allocation and planning decisions is desirable. In conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman will be able to provide advice on resource allocation issues from a macromanagement viewpoint. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review measures and options available to implement this suggestion and will make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in the near future.
 - b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly support the concept of assigning responsibility for development of national security policies and objectives to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The establishment of a Planning Office to provide timely promulgation of national security objectives and policies for incorporation into all DOD documents, especially in the areas of long-range and contingency planning, would substantially increase the effectiveness of DOD operations.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also support actions which would enhance the role of both the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their relationship with the commanders of the unified and specified commands. Such an increased role would result in more effective management and increased combat readiness of military forces worldwide. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will undertake a review of DOD Directive 5100.1, as suggested, and submit recommendations for its modification, if appropriate, consistent with Title 10, US Code.

3. Detailed comments and conclusions reflecting the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on each of the recommendations are contained in Appendices A and B. As indicated in the Appendices, there is general agreement with the thrust of the recommendations in the studies. Many specific points will be immediately implemented. Some of the issues need further examination and must be carefully weighed to determine the full impact upon operational capabilities as well as staff relationships. This review/implementation process is expected to be evolutionary in nature. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, as appropriate, provide their views on these issues as analyses are completed, and they look forward to continued discussions and decisions regarding these important issues.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

APPENDIX A	<u>1</u>
COMMENTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	<u>2</u>
ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE	
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE STUDY	<u>3</u>
1. <u>The Unified Command Plan (UCP)</u>	<u>4</u>
a. The UCP should be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff	<u>5</u>
and the Secretary of Defense at intervals not to exceed two	<u>6</u>
years.	<u>7</u>
(1) <u>Comments/Views.</u> The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur	<u>8</u>
in the recommendation suggesting periodic review of the	<u>9</u>
UCP to assure its conformity with current diplomatic-	<u>10</u>
military realities and the requirements of the Depart-	<u>11</u>
ment of Defense for effective management of US Armed	<u>12</u>
Forces. A complete review of the UCP was conducted in	<u>13</u>
1975; specific issue revisions of the UCP were conducted	<u>14</u>
in 1976 and 1977. Additionally, a review of the UCP is	<u>15</u>
currently in process by members of the Joint Staff and	<u>16</u>
the Services, and recommendations resulting from this	<u>17</u>
review will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense	<u>18</u>
as appropriate. Further, the annual administrative review	<u>19</u>
of the UCP, currently conducted by the Joint Staff, will	<u>20</u>
be expanded in alternate years to include addressal by	<u>21</u>
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.	<u>22</u>
(2) <u>Conclusion.</u> Current Joint Staff procedures requiring	<u>23</u>
annual administrative review of the UCP will be amended	<u>24</u>
to provide for addressal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff	<u>25</u>
in alternate years.	<u>26</u>
b. Selection of the commanders of unified and specified	<u>27</u>
commands should be on the basis of the best available	<u>28</u>
qualified officer with consideration given to mission and	<u>29</u>
forces assigned rather than strictly to Service affiliations.	<u>30</u>

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support this recommendation. While it is recognized that, historically, commanders of unified commands have been appointed along Service lines, current assignment policies do not restrict assignments of commands to a specific Service. In providing nominations to the Secretary of Defense for unified command positions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will consider all officers named by the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

(2) Conclusion. Appointment of commanders for unified commands should continue to be made on the basis of qualification, giving due regard to mission and forces assigned.

c. In considering UCP organization and functions, a CINC's "military-diplomacy" role should be an important consideration.

(1) Comments/Views. Concur. It is important that the CINCs retain an overview responsibility for security assistance to countries in their area if the Secretary of Defense, and in turn the Secretary of State and the President, are to receive the totality of available military advice. The CINCs, assisted by their State Department-assigned political advisors, can provide "on the scene" detailed country requirements and assess the military-political implications to the country and area connected with each proposed level of assistance.

(2) Conclusion. In considering changes to the UCP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will assure that the military-diplomacy role of the CINCs will be given significant attention.

d. There is no need for unified commands to cover all areas of the world.

(1) Comments/Views. Concur. The UCP, as presently structured, recognizes there is no requirement to assign operational responsibility for all geographic areas of the world. US security interests will determine those areas where armed forces employment appears warranted and, hence, must be incorporated in the area of operational responsibility of a unified command. Prudence dictates that specific areas of the world not assigned to any commander of a unified command for operational responsibility may be assigned for contingency planning purposes at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should not make recommendations for assigning unified commanders area responsibilities for the sake of achieving global coverage. Current assignment practices should continue, with recommendations for assignment of areas being made on a case-by-case basis, consistent with evolutionary political-military requirements.

e. A special study should examine the component commands with a view toward identifying redundancies in functions and personnel, with particular attention given to the feasibility of consolidating the components' logistics functions.

(1) Comments/Views. Reduction of personnel and elimination of staff function redundancies are always desirable goals. Many steps have been taken in recent months to reduce or eliminate unnecessary or redundant functions at all military headquarters levels. Of significant note was the study directed by the Secretary

(2) EUCOM should continue to plan for, and execute when directed, all contingency operations in the Middle East.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this recommendation. If the Middle East remains an area of USEUCOM responsibility, as recommended above, USCINCEUR should conduct contingency planning for the area and should execute contingency plans when ordered, since his staff would be most familiar with planning factors and conditions in the area of operations.

(b) Conclusion. USCINCEUR should continue to plan for and conduct operations in the Middle East, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) There should be sufficient flexibility in Middle East planning to permit a contingency being run directly from Washington, with EUCOM in a supporting role and/or to permit establishment of an on-scene unified command reporting either to EUCOM or direct to Washington.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this recommendation. Current technology provides the flexibility to direct operations in the Middle East from Washington or to permit establishment of an on-scene unified command if the situation warrants.

(b) Conclusion. The flexibility of current command arrangements should be retained; however, to the degree possible, both the established chain of command and existing contingency plans should be used for crisis management.

(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should examine the concept of a sub-unified command for the Middle East reporting

to EUCOM, and then provide their advice on the proposal to the Secretary of Defense.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this recommendation warrants a detailed examination in the light of the 1973 Middle East experience and possible scenarios which might occur in the future. It should be noted that USCINCEUR currently possesses the authority to establish such a sub-command if, in his view, the situation demands such action.

(b) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conjunction with USCINCEUR, should examine this recommendation in detail and provide the Secretary of Defense appropriate recommendations.

(5) Africa South of the Sahara should not now be assigned to EUCOM.

(a) Comments/Views. In view of current Soviet and Cuban initiatives in Africa, this recommendation has significant implications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now examining a variety of planning alternatives for Africa south of the Sahara. These alternatives include assignment of area responsibility or responsibility for planning only to a unified command, or to retain responsibility for planning within the Joint Staff. The six commanders of unified and specified commands who addressed this subject indicated that a requirement exists to identify unified command responsibilities for the area.

(b) Conclusion. Specific comment on this recommendation is deferred pending completion of the current study effort.

g. US Atlantic Command

(1) LANTCOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the recommendation. However, LANTCOM areas and responsibilities should continue to be reexamined on a periodic basis as part of the UCP review in light of constantly shifting political-military conditions.

(b) Conclusion. Current LANTCOM area responsibilities are appropriate and should be retained.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should review the command arrangements for US maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and determine whether these achieve optimum effectiveness for US and NATO postures.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this recommendation. Command arrangements for US maritime assets will be examined in consideration of USCINCEUR's and CINCLANT's responsibilities. Further, in the course of normal operational functions, CMC staffs will continue to examine such command arrangements to assure maximum effectiveness and acceptability of any necessary adjustments with NATO Allies.

(b) Conclusion. In view of the need to assure flexibility of available resources, an examination of command arrangements for US maritime assets will be undertaken.

h. US Pacific Command

(1) PACOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.

of Defense in October 1975. The actions resulting from
that study and subsequent reviews have resulted in
significant reductions in personnel strengths and
elimination of headquarters' functions throughout all levels
of the unified and specified commands, and in Service
staffs as well. Any further reductions must be approached
with caution. A consideration of functions, personnel,
and Service requirements must take into account the
unique missions and requirements of each headquarters.
Reductions in component command headquarters, for example,
could lead to matching increases in unified command
headquarters in order to assure performance of adminis-
trative, as opposed to operational, functions now
performed by component commanders.

(2) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
recent and ongoing staff and function reviews have
reduced major military headquarters to the minimum level
consistent with operational requirements. However, the
results of studies now underway regarding management of
both Service and joint command logistics functions will
be evaluated for additional opportunities to achieve
greater efficiency in operations.

f. US European Command

(1) The Middle East should remain a EUCOM area of
responsibility.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur
in this recommendation. Continued assignment of the
Middle East to USEUCOM recognizes existing political-
military relations.

(b) Conclusion. Current area responsibility is
appropriate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue
to examine command arrangements as indicated in sub-
paragraphs (3) and (4) below.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this recommendation. In view of the situation in the Pacific theater, current PACOM area responsibilities best meet the security requirements of the United States.

(b) Conclusion. Current PACOM area assignment and responsibilities are appropriate and should be retained

(2) Planning, practices, and attitudes regarding crisis/wartime command arrangements for US Forces, Korea should retain maximum flexibility to permit alternative arrangements to include the present command organization, direct command by Washington of US Forces, Korea, or a combination of the two. Where organizational decisions cannot be made to accommodate these alternatives, they should be made in favor of an assumption that there will be a unified command reporting directly to Washington.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the view that flexibility in command arrangements is necessary. The present structure provides the flexibility for control of a Korean conflict through the established chain of command (CINCPAC; Commander, US Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA)) or directly from Washington. In each case, command authority, relationships, and responsibilities are clearly stated, provide for unity of command for combat and support operations, and avoid overlapping control of concurrent operations by separate commands. Thus, flexibility is provided without the risk of loss of control inherent in loosely defined command relationships and responsibilities.

(b) Conclusion. The flexibility inherent in the current alternative command structures should be retained; moreover, any decision as to which structure will be utilized in a Korean contingency should be made only after evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the advantages and disadvantages of each under the circumstances existing during the crisis encountered.

(3) The Army component command should not be reinstated unless a convincing argument is made that this would be demonstrably more effective than present arrangements.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the view that command structures should be changed only when significant management and/or command control improvements can be perceived as achievable. The Army is currently conducting a thorough and detailed examination of the Army component structure in the Pacific theater. The objective of the study is to make recommendations regarding the appropriate command structure for Army forces in the Pacific theater. The study is examining all aspects of the issue and will consider carefully the views of the Service, component commanders, and the commanders of unified commands.

(b) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the results of the ongoing Army study and will forward appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

1. US Readiness Command

(1) REDCOM should be designated as the focal point for the coordination of the day-to-day aspects of mobilization deployment planning of all CINCs, particularly as they

pertain to lift requirements and detailed follow-through during major reinforcements.

(a) Comments/Views. USREDCOM is presently the coordinating authority for intertheater deployment of assigned augmentation forces by common-user lift. Possible expansion of USREDCOM's role to include acting as the focal point for mobilization and deployment planning, particularly as it pertains to coordination of lift requirements for commands and the Services and the detailed management of the movement of personnel and material during a major reinforcement operation, is under review. The scope of the review does not include the authority to allocate lift between CINCs, which remains a JCS function. The JCS Exercise scheduled for this fall (NIPTY NUGGET) will focus on mobilization and deployment matters and will contribute significantly to the ongoing review.

(b) Conclusion. Comments and recommendations are deferred until completion of Exercise NIPTY NUGGET and the review in progress.

(2) REDCOM should have greater Naval and Marine forces participation in its joint training exercises.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this recommendation. Navy and Marine force participation in USREDCOM joint exercises has been increasing over the past year, and further expansion of this participation would unquestionably be profitable. Limiting factors have been the availability of sufficient exercise funding and Navy forces to accommodate the total training/exercise requirement. Efforts

will be made to further increase Navy and Marine force participation in USREDCOM exercises within the constraints of asset and funding limitations.

(b) Conclusion. The Navy and Marine Corps, in conjunction with USREDCOM, will seek ways to increase participation in USREDCOM exercises of mutual benefit.

(3) REDCOM should be given a broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that development of effective joint doctrine for all forces is an area which requires continual emphasis and improvement and that USREDCOM should play a significant role in this process. Development of such doctrine is an evolutionary process and is assigned to a specific Service or agency on the basis of that Service/agency's expertise. Service components, on both a unilateral and bilateral basis, continuously review and seek to improve those areas of joint doctrine for which they are responsible (e.g., recent Tactical Air Command-US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TAC-TRADOC) efforts to improve close air-ground operations). USREDCOM acts as a catalyst in identifying doctrinal deficiencies in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures and in identifying areas for which no joint doctrine currently exists. An example of USREDCOM contribution in this process was its role in Exercise BRAVE SHIELD 16, conducted at Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California, in July 1977. This exercise, which involved Active US Marine Corps and both Active and Reserve US Army and US Air Force units, resulted in development

- canal defense, this review will consider factors
pertaining to US relationships throughout Latin
America, such as regional diplomatic-military roles,
security assistance, and contingency planning.
- k. Strategic Air Command. No study recommendations made.
- l. Military Airlift Command. No study recommendations made.
- m. Aerospace Defense Command. No study recommendations made.
2. Wartime/Crisis Management

a. The chain of command to be used in any particular crisis should be clearly enunciated at the outset. If any element is to be by-passed, it should remain fully informed of developments. There should be no confusion as to the proper flow of communications and the locus of responsibility.

b. NCA decisions during crises should be written and verified whenever possible. Even oral decisions required during emergencies should be followed up immediately in writing. In addition, feedback mechanism should be established to insure that decisionmakers know the status of implementation.

c. A variety of NMCC-centered command post exercises responding to realistic hypothetical crises should be undertaken to test the ability of the National Military Command System to support the NCA. Senior level policy-making personnel should be encouraged to participate.

(1) Comments/Views on Recommendations a, b, and c

(a) The Joint Chiefs of staff strongly endorse these recommendations. The JCS Crisis Action System, Joint Reporting Structure, and an entire series of JCS publications describe structured, yet flexible, procedures for crisis management utilizing the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS) and the National Military Command System facilities.

of recommendations for improving joint procedures 1
and techniques in the areas of strategic air 2
mobility, CONUS land/surface transportation systems, 3
and mobility support forces. Further, USREDCOM's 4
activities in the area of joint doctrinal improvement 5
have increased in recent months. An example is the 6
emphasis on, and revised directives to the USREDCOM 7
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Review 8
Group (JTTPRG), whose representation has been expanded 9
to include USEUCOM, PACOM, TRADOC, and additional 10
USREDCOM component headquarters. Referral of 11
doctrinal issues to responsible Services/agencies 12
by JTTPRG and other USREDCOM components and the 13
subsequent resolution of these issues by the Services 14
have resulted in increased operational efficiency 15
during joint exercises. 16

(b) Conclusion. Responsibility for development of 17
joint doctrine should continue to be assigned under 18
current procedures (i.e., to the Service or agency 19
best equipped to develop doctrine and resolve issues). 20
Specific areas for which no joint doctrine exists 21
should be identified and assigned to the appropriate 22
agency. USREDCOM should continue to identify short- 23
comings/voids in joint doctrine and refer the problem 24
to the appropriate agency for resolution. 25

(4) Navy and Marine participation on the REDCOM staff 26
should be increased to achieve these objectives. 27

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 28
believe an increased level of naval staffing for 29
USREDCOM should be commensurate with increased 30
participation by Navy and Marine forces in USREDCOM 31

activities. USCINCRD has indicated that current 1
Navy and Marine Corps staffing (approximately 2
6 percent of the officers on the USREDCOM staff) 3
is adequate in view of present levels of naval force 4
participation in USREDCOM activities. 5

(b) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will 6
evaluate the requirement for additional naval repre- 7
sentation on the USREDCOM staff if the role of the 8
Navy and Marine Corps in USREDCOM increases. 9

1. US Southern Command 10

(1) Retain SOUTHCOM as presently constituted for at least 11
the period of negotiation and transfer of responsibilities 12
resulting from the Panama Canal treaties. 13

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur 14
in this recommendation, especially in view of 15
negotiations relating to the Panama Canal and the 16
current status of politico-military activities in 17
the Latin American area. 18

(b) Conclusion. USSOUTHCOM organizations and functions 19
are appropriate and should be retained. 20

(2) When this transition period is over, review the future 21
of SOUTHCOM in light of the then prevailing military/ 22
political environment. 23

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur 24
in this recommendation, recognizing the need for a 25
comprehensive examination of USSOUTHCOM 26
responsibilities and functions as the transition 27
period draws to a close. 28

(b) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will 29
initiate this review prior to termination of the 30
3- to 5-year transition period. In addition to 31

These procedures and facilities provide for the exchange of information between the CINCs and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) for the orderly development of military options for the implementation of NCA decisions. JCS publications delineate procedures, establish areas of responsibility, chain of command, and command relationships. The procedures provide for issuance of voice commands with record communications followup. All military execution directives in times of crisis are issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense and specifically approved by him. JCS Crisis Staffing Procedures provide for active participation in the NMCC by policy-level representatives of appropriate non-DOD agencies during crises.

(b) A series of NMCC-centered command post exercises (CPXs) are conducted regularly, including major semiannual JCS CPXs. In the fall of 1978, a major mobilization CPX is scheduled to include participation by senior-level representatives. While the procedures and systems for crisis management are generally sound, they have, as noted in the report, not been applied consistently during past crises. The participation of senior-level policymaking personnel in exercises would significantly enhance this process and insure the familiarity of key personnel with the facilities and procedures during actual crises.

(c) In discussing crisis management, the report identifies several areas that deserve continuing attention. Some areas, such as improved communications, improved reporting procedures, positive feedback on NCA directives, improved data collection

and processing, and improved analytical techniques are amenable to precrisis procedural and hardware fixes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will pursue these improvements. Specific ongoing efforts include:

1. Improvements to data handling and display capabilities in the NMCC.
2. Computer internetting to facilitate data processing.
3. Formatted reporting to improve data exchange in support of contingency planning during crises.
4. Regular, in-depth review of JCS crisis management documentation, such as the Crisis Action System and Crisis Staffing Procedures.

Other areas identified by the report, such as avoiding overcontrol and bypassing the chain of command; improved liaison between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and greater use of CINC contingency plans, must depend on the knowledge and judgment of senior participants at the time of the crisis.

(2) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to review and modify, as appropriate, established procedures and systems for crisis management, and will continue to exercise these procedures and systems at all command and policy levels in those agencies potentially involved in crises. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further reiterate their support for utilization of the established chain of command for crisis management to the maximum extent possible. Established command channels assure full coordination and transmission of information across

the spectrum of involved headquarters and utilize the	<u>1</u>
judgment of commanders on the scene who are most familiar	<u>2</u>
with local aspects of the problem.	<u>3</u>
3. <u>Management of the Unified and Specified Commands</u>	<u>4</u>
a. That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a	<u>5</u>
participating voice in determining requirements of forces	<u>6</u>
under his command.	<u>7</u>
(1) <u>Comments/Views</u> . The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe	<u>8</u>
that the CINCs must be active participants in determining	<u>9</u>
requirements for forces under their command. At present,	<u>10</u>
the CINCs are playing an increasingly active role in	<u>11</u>
determining such requirements as a result of evolutionary	<u>12</u>
processes which have occurred over the past several	<u>13</u>
years. The Secretary of Defense's recent initiative of	<u>14</u>
having CINCs submit quarterly reports directly to him and	<u>15</u>
USEUCOM's submission of a Master Priority List are two	<u>16</u>
examples of this process. Additionally, procedures exist for	<u>17</u>
CINC involvement in the development of the Joint Strategic	<u>18</u>
Planning Document, Joint Program Assessment Memorandum	<u>19</u>
(JPAM), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Another	<u>20</u>
recent development has been the annual submission by	<u>21</u>
the CINCs of their research and development objectives	<u>22</u>
to the Secretary of Defense; this submission is also	<u>23</u>
used in preparation of the R&D portions of the Joint	<u>24</u>
Strategic Planning System. CINC staffs are not equipped,	<u>25</u>
however, to develop balanced total force program advice,	<u>26</u>
particularly in the time-sensitive programming/budgeting	<u>27</u>
arena. The primary determinant of force requirements	<u>28</u>
should continue to be exercised through Service component	<u>29</u>
commanders assigned to the unified command.	<u>30</u>

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the interface
with the Secretary of Defense in transmitting orders
and instructions to the CINCs. In this latter capacity,
the Chairman will continue to act as the spokesman for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their corporate advisory
role. Care must be taken to assure that any formalized
changes in the role which the Chairman plays are in
conformity with Section 142, Title 10, USC, which
prohibits the Chairman from exercising military command
over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the Armed
Forces. *The JCS can't exercise it, either*

(2) Conclusion. The roles of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their
relationship with the CINCs should be enhanced. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff should undertake a review of DOD
Directive 5100.1, as suggested, and submit recommendations
for its modification, as appropriate, to assure a more
active interface with the Secretary of Defense and the
CINCs in the supervision of the combat readiness of the
unified and specified commands.

c. That the Services/Joint Chiefs of Staff/OSD conduct an
in-depth review of readiness capabilities reporting with a
view toward developing a system which will provide the
Secretary with detailed, thorough, and well-articulated
information on readiness and force capabilities including
limitations, and recommendations for deficiency correction.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur
in the view that definite improvements are possible in
current readiness reporting capabilities. The entire
issue of readiness reporting is presently being reviewed
under the purview of the DOD Readiness Management

(2) Conclusion. The direct dialogue between CINCs and the Secretary of Defense should continue and all CINCs should develop a submission similar to the USMCOM Master Priority List.

b. That the Secretary designate the Chairman as his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs and that to facilitate this, he amend present directives to indicate that he will normally transmit his orders to the CINCs through the Chairman, who will act in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when time permits. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would remain as the immediate military staff to the Secretary.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with enhancing the role of both the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff in their relationship with the commanders of unified and specified commands. DOD Directive 5100.1 specifies that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this directive should be reviewed, and revised if appropriate, to permit the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff a more active role in assuring the combat readiness of US Forces worldwide. Particular areas to be examined from a macromanagement viewpoint include resource allocation among unified and specified commands; force readiness status; oversight of the conduct of politico-military responsibilities, especially in the area of security assistance; and programming and budgeting functions. Further, the DOD directive could be amended, if necessary to formalize the present role of the

Steering Group. Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are reviewing JCS Policy Memo 172 (Combat Readiness
Reporting) and the JCS Semiannual Readiness Report in
in an effort to improve the timeliness, quality, and
utility of readiness data provided to the Secretary
of Defense. Most recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved terms of reference for the conduct of a static
assessment of total force readiness. Additionally,
the OJCS is working to develop a methodology with
which to assess total force capabilities in a dynamic
environment. This methodology will be designed to
support current and projected force readiness and capability
assessments. Other ongoing actions designed to improve the
OJCS ability to articulate readiness information and
identify limitations include: a national mobilization
exercise (NIFTY NUGGET) which will test mobilization
systems and procedures; Operation Plan Package Appraisal,
which examines capabilities to fulfill transportation
demands generated by the simultaneous implementation
of major operations plans; and Strategic Mobility Require-
ments and Programs - 1983, which will provide OSD and
the Service staffs an updated review and analysis of
strategic mobility alternatives and a recommended range
of alternative mobility programs.

(2) Conclusion. Further comment is deferred pending
completion of ongoing studies in this area.

d. That the Chairman, supported by the CINCs, be given a
formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe
that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, should have an

expanded role in resource allocation planning decisions. 1
 Operating under the revised Planning, Programming, 2
 and Budgeting System (PPBS) initiated this year, 3
 commanders of unified and specified commands made 4
 important inputs to this process. On the basis of 5
 experience gained during the current document cycle, 6
 it is anticipated that the quality and utility of the 7
 CINC inputs on resource allocation decisions will be 8
 improved during FY 1980. The appropriate role for the 9
 Joint Chiefs of Staff in resource allocation should be 10
 at a macromanagement level rather than from a detailed 11
 analysis perspective. The JCS role should 12
 focus on isolating key areas of risk associated with 13
 current and projected force capabilities to execute 14
 the national military strategy, establish the degree and 15
 relative importance of these key areas of risk, and 16
 recommend prioritized resource allocation in light 17
 thereof. Examples of broad issues with which the 18
 JCS should deal are proper balance among readi- 19
 ness, force modernization, and sustainability. 20
 Further, they should examine strategic forces, theater 21
 nuclear forces vs. general purpose forces, C³I, and 22
 strategic mobility. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should 23
 deal with these issues throughout the PPBS cycle, early 24
 in the Joint Strategic Planning Document period, before 25
 the publication of the Consolidated Guidance and after 26
 publication of the Program Objective Memorandum, 27
 the JPAM, and the follow-on Issue Paper/Program Decision 28
 Memorandum review process. In view of the expanding 29
 complexity of resource allocation issues, even at the 30
 macromanagement level, continued participation by the 31

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, (supported by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs) in this process will
require internal OJCS functional adjustments and/or
additional resources to provide proper support.
Studies to determine the requirements necessary to
provide capabilities required to support the Chairman
in this expanded role are underway.

(2) Conclusion. The Chairman, supported by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, should have an expanded
role in resource allocation and planning decisions.
While the role of the Chairman and the CINCs in
resource allocation planning will evolve together
with the revised Joint Strategic Planning System and
PPBS, additional measures and options are available.
Recommendations regarding these options, resulting
from the ongoing review, will be forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense.

4. Policy, Plans, and Advice

a. Specific national security policy guidance, which sets
objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should
be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but without undue
detail about how they are to be attained.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur
in this recommendation. Provision by the Secretary
of Defense of policy guidance is a necessary element of
civilian/military relationships and helps drive the
process which develops the defense program. Experience
with the Consolidated Guidance this year highlights the
need for concise policy statements.

(2) Conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly
support the establishment of a policy base as intended
by this proposal.

(a) Comments/Views: The Joint Chiefs of Staff support these recommendations and the related recommendations in the Ignatius report dealing with creation of a policy planning office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP). The office of the USDP should assure that national security policy and objectives are clearly and cogently disseminated and that national security objectives and defense policy are accurately reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other PPBS documents. The policy planning office would provide a long-needed focal point for policy advice in support of long-range and contingency planning. The focus of this office should be on articulating policy guidance, and it should be responsible for insuring that defense policy is consistent with national policy and that all DOD elements carry out that policy in their planning functions. Functioning of the office would be enhanced by the presence of active duty military officers familiar with the Joint Strategic Planning System. Detailed aspects of operational planning, including review, should remain with the uniformed military structure, as should the formulation of military strategy. For maximum effectiveness, the planning office should interface directly with the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, who is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with staff responsibility for recommendations concerning long-range and contingency planning.

(b) Conclusion. Designation of responsibilities for the USDP, as described above, could serve to complement the Joint Staff operational planning functions and provide a needed focal point for policy advice in support of

JCS preparation of contingency, mid-range, and long-range documents. The planning office, staffed in part by active duty military officers, should interface directly with the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff.

(4) Coordinating DOD input to national intelligence matters.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support this recommendation. In order to carry out the intelligence responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, as outlined in Executive Order 12036, the USDP has been directed to formulate policy, validate all requirements, and insure that programs respond to stated requirements. However, substantive intelligence matters such as the production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence should continue under the purview of the Director, DIA, and, as such, should be separated from policymaking considerations in order to prevent the potential influence of policy upon intelligence judgments.

(b) Conclusion. The USDP should undertake coordination of general intelligence policy matters, priorities, and requirements. In order to assure that the production, review, and coordination of substantive national foreign intelligence matters as outlined in Executive Order 12036 and other current directives not be diluted, DIA should continue to have prime responsibility in these areas.

(5) Coordinating the annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by DOD and outside agencies to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.

b. The Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected key assistants should regularly review current military operational planning.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize and endorse the requirement for a review of broad operational planning concepts to assure consistency with policy guidelines and to keep key OSD officials informed as to operational capabilities. The dialogue resulting from such overview briefings should assure sufficient responsiveness of JCS/Joint Staff plans to policy guidance and objectives and should also provide senior OSD officials with a better understanding of military capabilities in relation to national policy requirements. The goal is to create a basis for recommending appropriate actions to bring capabilities and requirements into closer alignment.

(2) Conclusion. Information briefings to the Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected key assistants should be provided as requested, or when major changes to plans involving alteration in political/guidance assumptions occur.

c. The role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should include:

(1) Assuring that national security policy and objectives are provided to and reflected in the JCS/JS plans for contingencies/crises, conventional wars, and tactical and strategic nuclear wars.

(2) Developing long-range national security policy plans for consideration by the NCA.

(3) Assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other PPBS documents.

(a) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
endorse coordination of DOD and outside agency
study programs. A DOD study program should be
developed annually to select and prioritize DOD
studies in order to facilitate completion of such
efforts on a timely basis, within the constraints
of existing analytical resources. Care must be
taken to assure that resolution of all issues, and
in particular strategy and force planning problems,
includes full consideration of military expertise
and advice. This proposal, if approved, will neces-
sitate revision of DOD Directive 5010.22 in its appli-
cability to mission and functional responsibilities
of the USDP, Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (USDRE), the Services, and the OJCS.
(b) Conclusion. A Senior Study Advisory Group
should be established with senior-level representa-
tion from the Office of the USDP, the Office of the
USDRE, the Services, and the OJCS. The group's
purpose would be to set/recommend priorities,
provide general direction, and establish broad
policy guidance for the conduct and management
of an annual DOD study program. This group would
consolidate all study requests and would be
supported by separate working groups dealing with
the different yet interrelated analytic activities
involving the Consolidated Guidance Study Plan;
net assessments; Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation studies; and plans and policy studies.

d. The Assistant Secretaries for ISA and PA&E, the Director for Net Assessment, and DOD intelligence elements should report to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Policy, who would have tasking and coordinating responsibilities for these offices, while they would retain responsibility and control over the substantive judgments and evaluations of their offices.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the value of centralized tasking and coordinated responsibilities. With regard to that portion of this recommendation which pertains to ISA, PA&E, and the Director of Net Assessment, the Joint Chief of Staff see merit in examining such an organizational structure, but defer comment to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, it should be noted that the Director, DIA, is the substantive intelligence adviser to the Secretary of Defense and should report to him on these matters. Furthermore, the Director, DIA, should continue to report to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters concerning intelligence support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified and specified commands.

(2) Conclusion. While it is appropriate and necessary for the Director, DIA, to report to the Secretary through USDP on intelligence policy matters, priorities, and requirements, the substance of intelligence must not be subject to management or policy review. Therefore, the Director, DIA, should continue to report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on substantive intelligence matters. Service intelligence agencies should continue to report to their Service Secretaries.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff

a. The JCS should revise their procedures to:

(1) Make the Joint Staff alone responsible for authorship of JCS papers.

(2) Present comprehensive analysis of alternatives, whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views.

(3) Provide initial high level guidance to the Joint Staff when appropriate.

(a) Comments/Views on recommendations (1), (2), and (3).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the thrust of these recommendations is the desire to improve the quality and utility of JCS papers. The solution may not lie in total adoption of any single recommendation but instead may involve partial implementation of all three. The current system of processing papers through the flimsy/buff/green cycle, while fundamentally sound, can be adjusted to retain the benefits of early Service advice without diluting divergent views at the lowest levels. Attempts to improve the current system should be directed toward the early presentation of alternative solutions at the higher levels of the Service and Joint staffs and the development of firm guidance for these staffs in the early stages of paper development. Consideration should also be given to providing the Secretary of Defense an overview of principal alternatives examined and the rationale for formulation of a specific recommendation. This presentation of alternative views, along with the identification of specific Service reservations regarding a recommendation, would facilitate the Secretary of Defense's evaluation of key issues.

(b) Conclusion. The Director, Joint Staff, in conjunction with the Military Services, should review the current system for development and presentation of JCS papers in light of the recommendations and comments presented in the Steadman report.

b. The Secretary of Defense should reissue the Gates Memorandum with a narrower definition of joint assignments and delegate authority to determine exceptions only to the Chairman, JCS.

(1) Comments/Views. A recent revision of DOD Directive 1320.5 has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The revised directive provides narrower definitions of joint duty and delegates waiver authority to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Since the Chairman is not formally in the promotion list review process, it would be inappropriate for him to have waiver authority and, in effect, promotion list approval.

(2) Conclusion. DOD Directive 1320.5 should continue to reflect waiver authority retained at the Military Department Secretary level.

c. The Service Chiefs should commit their most outstanding and highly qualified officers for assignment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Secretary should empower the CJCS to obtain assignment to the Joint Staff of any requested officer, with temporary exceptions determined by the CJCS.

(1) Comments/Views on Recommendations c and d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that policies regarding assignment of officers to the Joint Staff must consider the needs of the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and the individual's professional development. JCS	<u>1</u>
policies clearly require the Services to nominate	<u>2</u>
highly qualified officers for joint duty. Current	<u>2</u>
directives charge the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,	<u>4</u>
with determining the acceptability of nominated officers	<u>5</u>
and provide him approval authority. Further, the	<u>6</u>
Chairman currently enjoys the prerogative of requesting	<u>7</u>
assignment of specific officers to the Joint Staff	<u>8</u>
on an individual basis. Initiatives can be taken to	<u>9</u>
improve the perception of Joint Staff duty.	<u>10</u>
(2) <u>Conclusion</u> . The Joint Chiefs of Staff should con-	<u>11</u>
tinue to emphasize the requirement for selection of	<u>12</u>
highly qualified officers for Joint Staff duty. Addi-	<u>13</u>
tionally, the Director, Joint Staff, will develop	<u>14</u>
initiatives which might enhance individual officer	<u>15</u>
perceptions of the desirability of Joint Staff duty.	<u>16</u>
e. That the Secretary of Defense designate the Chairman,	<u>17</u>
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as responsible for providing	<u>18</u>
military advice from a national viewpoint on programming	<u>19</u>
and budget issues.	<u>20</u>
f. That the Chairman be given appropriate Joint Staff	<u>21</u>
support to make broad program and budget judgments.	<u>22</u>
(1) <u>Comments/Views on Recommendations e and f</u> . The	<u>23</u>
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking for the Joint	<u>24</u>
Chiefs of Staff, should actively participate in major program-	<u>25</u>
ming and budget deliberations. The Joint Strategic Planning	<u>26</u>
System was recently revised for the specific purpose	<u>27</u>
of improving the quality, utility, and timeliness of	<u>28</u>
the JCS input to the PPBS. In the new sequence of PPBS	<u>29</u>
documents, the Service Chiefs, through development and	<u>30</u>
submission of POMs, provide informed judgments on	<u>31</u>

programming and budget issues from the vantage point of day-to-day familiarity with the problems and capabilities of their respective Services. The JPAM, which is based in large part on Service POMs, identifies program priorities and alternatives for the NCA on identified programming and budget issues. As expertise with the new documents is acquired, it is believed that the JPAM will evolve into an even more useful management tool for providing the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the information and judgments required to represent JCS views on major programming and budget issues. A study is underway to determine if additional staff support is required to provide the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with data necessary to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making broad programming and budgeting judgments.

(2) Conclusion. Further comment is deferred pending evaluation of the new PPBS cycle and the completion of the ongoing review to assess requirements for additional staff support.

g. That the CJCS be established as a voting member of the DSARC.

(1) Comments/Views. In accordance with DOD Directive 5000.2, 18 January 1977, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently represented at Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meetings by a senior officer who acts in an advisory role to the principals and presents the Chairman's views on each major weapons system acquisition program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the impact of military advice from a national perspective would be enhanced if the Joint Chiefs of Staff

as a corporate body were represented on the DSARC by a senior Joint Staff officer designated as a DSARC principal.

(2) Conclusion. DOD Directive 5000.2 should be revised to reflect a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a principal member of the DSARC.

h. That the CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate, manage an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by the Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the Services as appropriate. It should be designed to clarify or resolve major issues in the areas of joint military strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.

(1) Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the fundamental need for better management of the entire DOD studies and analysis program. However, OJCS studies represent only a small fraction of the total JCS/OSD study effort. It would be inappropriate for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be involved in the line management of a study program which infringes upon the requirements and resources of the Military Department Secretaries and Service Chiefs. The requirement for coordination of all study programs is recognized and strongly endorsed, however, and a more effective vehicle for efficient management of study assets is required. A DOD Senior Study Advisory Group with senior level representation from the Office of the USDP, Office of the USDRE, the Services, and the OJCS could provide the vehicle needed for orderly prioritization and completion of annual study requirements.

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are all
senior to
4th level
what the
representative
would be
that call

(2) Conclusion. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1
should not manage an annual study program of the type 2
proposed but, rather, designate a general/flag 3
officer or equivalent civilian to represent the OJCS 4
on a Senior Study Advisory Group chaired by a senior 5
representative of the Office of the USDP. The 6
OJCS representative should help set/recommend 7
study priorities and provide policy guidance and 8
general direction to that portion of the DOD study 9
program which directly impacts the JSFS or the mission/ 10
functions of the OJCS or the Services. 11

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS STUDY

1. Use the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), as it was chartered, to offer the Secretary of Defense regular and frequent advice in the formulation of Defense policy, restricting membership to civilian and military statutory authorities.

a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur and believe that a stricter enforcement of the DOD directive which outlines the organization, membership, and functioning of the AFPC could result in production of more useful advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide issues resulting from Secretary of Defense-JCS meetings to the Secretary, AFPC, for scheduling as AFPC agenda items.

b. Conclusion. The study recommendations should be initiated. Further, there is current legislative activity which proposes that the Commandant of the Marine Corps be made a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If this proposal is enacted, then it would be appropriate for the Commandant to become a statutory member of the AFPC. If this proposal is not enacted in the immediate future, it would be appropriate for the Commandant to remain an ad hoc member of the AFPC.

2. Establish a Planning Office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, formally linked in liaison to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with assignments including political-military long-range planning and contingency planning oriented to the formulation of Defense policy guidance and in mutual support with overall national security policies.

- a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly endorse creation of a Policy Planning Office under the USDP. The JCS views in Appendix A, page 24, as relate to the role of the USDP, apply to this recommendation. 1
- b. Conclusion. A Policy Planning Office under the USDP which complements the Joint Staff operational planning functions would provide a needed focal point for policy advice in support of JCS preparation of contingency, mid-range, and long-range documents. Such an office, staffed in part by active duty military officers, should interface directly with the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff. 2
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3. Require the Under Secretary for Policy to support the Secretary of Defense in the development of Defense Policy Guidance governing the other parts of the Consolidated Guidance, working in close coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1
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- a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur and strongly endorse the need for broad policy guidance from other than a predominantly programmatic viewpoint. 18
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- b. Conclusion. A more appropriate link in coordination would be with the Director, Joint Staff, who would act as the point of contact for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 21
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4. Incorporate into the earliest DSARC milestone an analysis of the requirement for the candidate system to meet its primary mission, to contribute to secondary missions, and to assess its value in connection with other planned or operating systems designed to meet the same primary or secondary missions. 24
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a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur and 1
note that the recommendation describes the action currently 2
prescribed to be accomplished at Defense Systems Acquisition 3
Review Council (DSARC) Milestone 1. The earliest milestone in 4
the acquisition cycle is Milestone 0, which is the approval of 5
the Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) and is governed by 6
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109 and 7
appropriate DOD directives. 8

b. Conclusion. Current DOD directives responsive to OMB 9
procedures provide adequate guidance for addressal of 10
these issues at appropriate DSARC milestones. 11

5. Capitalizing on the orderly, phased program development 12
schedule of the Consolidated Guidance, significantly reduce 13
the budget review process--eliminating redundant or repetitive 14
program review within Defense headquarters and in OMB--limit- 15
ing budget review to pricing refinements and the program 16
implications that result from pricing changes and "fact-of- 17
life" changes. 18

a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly 19
support efforts to improve the efficiency of the budget 20
review process and to eliminate redundant review. This 21
problem, which is felt most heavily by the Services, is 22
accentuated by the tendency to reopen program decisions 23
that have already been subject to rigorous analysis and 24
approval processes. The result is often detrimental to 25
a balanced Defense program. However, it is probably 26
simplistic to propose that budget review can, or even 27
should, be limited to pricing changes and "fact of life" 28
changes. One of the more promising changes to the 29
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in recent 30
years is the current effort to secure firm Presidential 31
guidance prior to issuance of amended Program Decision 32
Memorandums (PDMs) and commencement of the budget 33

- b. Conclusion. Implementation of the study proposal would appear to be in the best interests of the Department of Defense.
8. Make multi-service assignments to Service Secretaries from time to time, instead of to Under Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
- a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur and note that it may be advantageous for the Military Department Secretaries to perform this role, provided that effective and appropriate coordination procedures are observed.
- b. Conclusion. At the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, this proposal could be implemented on a trial basis.
9. Establish a formal role for the Service Under Secretaries oriented to common liaison functions with OSD, in addition to the normal responsibilities of the office.
- a. Comments/Views. The recommendation has no direct impact on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Conclusion. Comment on this proposal is deferred to the Military Department Secretaries.
10. As a start toward reducing staff layers and individual staff components, authorize the Service Secretaries to eliminate their Assistant Secretaries for the Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics functions, placing reliance for conduct of these functions on the respective Service Chiefs and on the OSD staffs in the two functional areas.
- a. Comments/Views. The recommendation has no direct impact on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Conclusion. Comment on this proposal is deferred to the Military Department Secretaries.

11. Integrate, in each Service, the Research and Engineering Staffs now separately reporting to the Assistant Service Secretary and Service Chief, allowing for joint responsibilities to the Service Secretary and Service Chief; concurrently, the Secretary of Defense should increase the number of the development and acquisition programs falling under the primary management authority of the Services.

a. Comments/Views. The recommendation has no direct impact on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Conclusion. Comment on the proposal is deferred to the Military Department Secretaries.

12. Through procedures acceptable to the respective Service Secretaries, provide common access for both the Service Secretary and the Service Chief to the Military Departments' System Analysis, Inspector General, and Audit Service capabilities.

a. Comments/Views. The recommendation has no direct impact on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Conclusion. Comment on this proposal is deferred to the Military Department Secretaries.

13. Encourage a continuation of the effort underway to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area.

a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the study reflects a significant decrease in staff strengths over the past 5 years and states that there are practical limits to further reductions. While there have been reductions in numbers within the staffs, the demands placed upon them have increased dramatically. For example, as noted in the study, the number of DOD witnesses before 24 congressional committees in 1964

was 630. In 1977, there were 3,437 DOD witnesses providing testimony before 75 congressional committees. There have also been significantly expanded staff requirements by virtue of increased cooperative efforts with US allies. The result has been a decrease in staff flexibility and in staff capability to respond to tasking as rapidly as would often be desired.

b. Conclusion. Any further proposed reductions must be carefully weighed for overall impact and degradation of functional capability. Further comment is deferred pending completion of the Defense Resource Management Study.

14. The study suggested that it would be worthwhile to examine a change in the management of the Defense Nuclear Agency along the following lines: designation of the Director, DNA, as a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, incorporating the responsibilities of the old Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), including statutory appointment as the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee (MLC).

a. Comments/Views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the current relationship with the Defense Nuclear Agency is highly satisfactory. The comments of the Director, DNA, favoring realignment as suggested in the study can also be appreciated. The Director, DNA, believes the proposal may streamline staffing and organizational functions and would use DNA's potential more fully; however, the proposal has potentially significant implications concerning JCS and Service statutory responsibilities regarding the development of nuclear weapons and policy, stockpile configurations, and allocation and deployment of weapons to the unified and specified commands.

b. Conclusion. The concept requires a thorough, separate analysis to assess the full spectrum of implications inherent in the proposal prior to effecting any realignment in DNA organisation and functions. This should be accomplished in conjunction with the overall examination of Defense agencies which will be undertaken and should specifically address the relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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